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INTRODUCTION
The "business is business" culture has been prevalent for centuries. In 1924, Sheldon (1924) introduced the concept of "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR) for the first time in the business environment. Since that time, awareness across the globe of the impact of businesses on society has increased significantly and firms have come under greater pressure from society, governments, and other stakeholders to behave responsibly. One driver for the increase in pressure of businesses is the greed of firms in consuming scarce resources in order to realize profits, regardless of the negative implications for society. The negative implications of firms' operations have been apparent in several social and environmental disasters. For example, a toxic gas release tragedy occurred on 3 December 1984 in India and leaving around 16,000 dead in a few days. Furthermore, on 26 April 1986, the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine exploded causing several deaths, in addition to creating dangerous social and environmental conditions. Accordingly, firms face a greater pressure to act socially and operate responsibly than ever before. International concerns in relation to the business-society relationship have resulted in the establishment of organizations and standards that aim to monitor and help firms behave socially and responsibly. Examples of these organizations include AccountAbility which is based in London, the African Institute of Corporate Citizenship (AICC), Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) in the USA, and Business in the Community (BiTC) in UK. Furthermore, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) issued ISO 26000 as an international standard that provides guidelines on social responsibility for all public and private firms. This standard aims to help firms undertake and manage their social responsibility strategies and activities that affect society and the environment. The rising pressure on firms to behave socially entails measuring and demonstrating how their activities affect different stakeholders including societies and the environment. This extends the accountability of managers to incorporate social and environmental dimensions in their accounting measurements and disclosures. This is based on the assumption that CSR disclosure can play an important role in communicating whether or not firms behave socially and to what extent firms respect society and the environment. Moreover, CSR disclosure can be argued to be one of the most important voluntary disclosure types, since it highlights the influence of firms' operations on world resources and human life and welfare. Accordingly, rising global awareness of the social responsibility of firms has increased the need for high quality CSR disclosure. Concurrent with the increased concern for CSR disclosure, Corporate Governance (CG) objectives have evolved to accommodate new relationships never previously been deemed necessary, i.e. business-environment and business-society relations. For example, Claessens (2003, p. 7) states, "In its broadest sense, CG is concerned with holding a balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals". Furthermore, CG has developed to incorporate ethics, accountability, disclosure, and reporting (Gill, 2008) . Accordingly, the different CG mechanisms, such as boards of directors, audit committees, and auditors are responsible for monitoring and controlling managers' decisions and firms' activities that affect all stakeholders including society. This may reveal a correlation between effectiveness of CG systems and quality of CSR disclosure. An effective CG system is likely to be concerned with disclosure and transparency in general, and with disclosure of material activities that affect society and environment in particular. Empirically, Said et al. (2009) find a positive significant correlation between government ownership and audit committee and CSR disclosure. Moreover, Khan (2010) and Das et al. (2015) find a positive significant correlation between board size, ownership structure, and independent non-executive directors on the board and CSR disclosure. These findings support the hypothesis of a potential positive correlation between CG and CSR disclosure. The main objective of this study is to determine the extent of CSR disclosure in a sample of Saudi non-financial listed firms and identify the main drivers of CSR disclosure by investigating a comprehensive and diversified set of variables involving CG variables, ownership variables, and corporate characteristics. The analysis finds that the average CSR disclosure is 24% and that government ownership, family ownership, firm leverage, firm size, and firm age are the main drivers of CSR disclosure in Saudi Arabia. This study is important for the following reasons. First, the study starts to fill the literature gap on CSR disclosure in Saudi Arabia; we find a clear paucity in this research area. Second, the study evaluates the Saudi Arabian CG reforms, especially after the recent application of the CG code in 2007. Third, Saudi Arabia accounts for 25% of the Arab world's GDP and is one of the largest oil exporters in the world. This study is organized as follows. The second section reviews the relevant studies and highlights the literature gaps. The third section formulates the study hypotheses. The fourth section reveals the study methodology. The fifth section discusses the results. The final section provides conclusions, implications, limitations and recommended future avenues for research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study examines the CSR disclosure determinants; therefore, this section reviews studies that focus on investigating these determinants, with a greater focus on emerging countries. Then it discusses the relevant studies conducted on Saudi Arabia. Authors find that 66% of the sample firms disclose 10-50 CSR statements on average. Furthermore, they find that profitability is the main determinant of CSR disclosure. However, they find no correlation between ownership structure, company size, gearing, and liquidity and CSR disclosure. In another study conducted on Egypt, Soliman et al. The results indicate a significant positive correlation between bank size, board size, ownership structure, and independent non-executive directors on the board and CSR disclosure. However, a negative significant correlation was found for banks' profitability and age and CRS disclosure. Finally, the disclosure literature provides very few studies on Saudi Arabia. In one relevant study, Mandurah et al. (2012) examines CSR activities in Saudi Arabia; however, the study does not examine the determinants of CSR. The study surveys a sample of 120 managers to assess their awareness of CSR, the extent of CSR integration in their corporate policies, and the nature and extent of these firms' CSR activities. The response rate was 65%; the results signal a reasonable level of CSR activities in Saudi Arabia, and to an adequate level of integration between social objectives and the strategic objectives of firms. In addition, Macarulla and Talalweh (2012) 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Audit Committee
The audit committee (AC) is supposed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting through monitoring and control (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983 ; Abdel-Fattah, 2008). However, this aim cannot be achieved unless the AC is effective. AC effectiveness depends on its composition and characteristics. According to Section 14 of the 2006 Saudi CG code, each firm should construct an AC of at least three non-executive directors, with at least one director specialized in financial and accounting affairs. The literature finds that effective AC is likely to affect positively the disclosure quality. For example, Soliman and Ragab (2014) find that effective AC, characterized by frequently meetings, improves the financial reporting quality. Furthermore, Xie et al. (2003) and Soliman and Ragab (2014) find that effective AC, measured by a high number of experts on the committee, enhances the reporting quality. In addition, Madawaki and Amran (2013, p. 1072) state: "It is expected that independent AC members will be more objective and less likely to overlook possible deficiencies in the misappropriation and manipulation of financial reporting". This argument is congruent with agency theory that argues that independent directors on boards and committees reduce information asymmetry. Accordingly, this study believes that effective AC could be a successful monitoring tool for managers' decisions, especially those related to the business social responsibility, which will be reflected in high quality CSR disclosure. Therefore, the study's first hypothesis is: H1: There is a positive correlation between audit committee effectiveness and CSR disclosure.
Board Independence
Boards play an essential role in monitoring and directing managers to satisfy the interests of stakeholders. However, the boards' monitoring effectiveness depends on its composition. Independent boards are more likely to inspire managers towards high transparency and disclosure quality levels (Forker, 1992 ; AbuRaya, 2012). Agency and stakeholder theories argue that a high ratio of independent directors on the board could be an important element of the CG structure that would help to resolve agency problems and advance the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees and local communities (Amran et al. 2009; Chen & Roberts, 2010) . Empirically, a large number of studies, including Barako and Brown (2008) and Khan et al. (2013) find that appointing non-executive directors on the board positively affect CSR disclosure. Accordingly, this study believes that non-executive directors on the board are more likely to encourage managers to act socially, and thus, provide high quality CSR disclosure. Congruent with the agency theory, the study second hypothesis is: H2: There is a positive correlation between board independence and CSR disclosure. ). Furthermore, agency theory suggests that role duality increases the concentration of decision-making power and that an independent Chairman provides strong power to the boards, which is reflected positively on the disclosure quality (Al-Janadi et al., 2013). Congruent with agency theory, this study believes in a negative correlation between role duality and CSR disclosure. Accordingly, the study's third hypothesis is: H3: There is a negative correlation between role duality and CSR disclosure.
Role Duality
Government Ownership
Generally, governments have political, economic, and social goals to achieve. The nature of governments' work is socially-oriented. This orientation could result in conflict between goals of governments, as owners, and the goals of profit maximization of private investors (Ntim et al., 2013) . However, this study argues that government ownership could maintain a degree of balance between the two competing goals, which may improve the profits of firms and effectively influence the society. Moreover, governments set and regularly issue regulations that protect society and therefore governments could be a good example of sponsoring and complying with these regulations through their ownership in firms. . This implies that those investors will be less interested in social activities and related disclosure. Based on these contrasting views, the study's fifth hypothesis is: H5: There is a correlation between institutional ownership and CSR disclosure. (2002) find that family firms are less likely to disclose information voluntarily. this study believesthat family firms could gain several social benefits from their shares in firms in addition to the financial gains, such as building a strong social image, prestige, good reputation and social position for their families. This approach should reflect in greater concern for and respect to society, and thus, in high quality CSR disclosure. Accordingly, the study's sixth hypothesis is: H6: There is a positive correlation between family ownership and CSR disclosure.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
The study population is all firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange during 2007-2011. Thus, this study starts with the year after the Saudi CG code was issued in November 2006. Table 1 exhibits the distribution of firm-year observations across the study years. First, the total initial sample comprises 694 observations distributed across the five years. Second, this study discards 172 observations which belong to financial and insurance companies. Third, this study excludes 255 observations with missing data on the study variables. Thus, the final sample comprises 267 observations. this study notices that the number of observations has increased gradually across the study period which in part may be due to the application of the Saudi CG code starting from 2007. In relation to the data sources, this study depends mainly on the firms' annual reports published on the firms' websites and on the website www.tadawual.com.sa. 
Independent Variables
This study presents a comprehensive diversified set of eleven independent variables to examine different CSR disclosure determinants. The first three are audit committee effectiveness, board independence, and the dual role of CEO and chairperson. The second three are ownership structure variables: government ownership, institutional ownership, and family ownership. The remaining variables are corporate characteristics presented as control variables: leverage, firm size, firm profitability, firm age, and industry type. It is noteworthy that this study measures audit committee effectiveness by an aggregate score similar to that used by Brown and Caylor (2006) and Jiang et al. (2008) . This study also depends on the characteristics of audit committees recommended by the Saudi 2006 CG code. Table 2 summarizes the measurements and definitions of the study variables.
( A proxy for AC effectiveness that takes the value one if the AC of the firm i and the year t, consists of fully independent members, with at least three members, one of whom is a financial expert, and holds at least three meetings a year, and zero otherwise.
Brdindit Board Independence
Board independence is measured by the ratio of outside directors to total number of directors on the board for the firm i during the year t.
DulRolit
Role Duality A dummy variable that equals one if the board chairman is also the CEO of the firm i and the year t, and zero otherwise.
Govownit Government Ownership
The ratio of shares held by the Saudi government or any of its agencies to the total number of outstanding shares of the firm i and the year t.
Instownit Institutional Ownership
The ratio of shares held by institutional investors to the total number of outstanding shares of the firm i and the year t.
Famownit Family Ownership
The ratio of shares held by family members to the total number of outstanding shares of the firm i and the year t.
Control Variables:
Levrgit Firm Leverage Total debts divided by the total assets of the firm i and the year t.
Asstit Firm Size
The natural logarithm of total assets of the firm i during the year t
ROAit Return on Assets
It is a proxy for firm performance, that is the ratio of total net income to the total assets of the firm i and the year t.
Ageit Firm Age
The natural Logarithm of period from first establishment of the firm i to the year t.
Indit Industry Type
This variable is divided into three dummy variables, each equals one if the firm i during the year t belongs to one of the following industries: Cement, petrochemicals and engineering, and real estate, and zero otherwise. The three selected industries are the biggest industries in the Saudi Arabia. 
RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
Pearson Correlation Test
The Pearson correlation test shows the strength and direction of correlations between the study variables and helps diagnose for any Multicollinearity problem. Table 4 shows that the highest independent variables' correlation is 0.46, which is between firm age and institutional ownership, followed by 0.40, between governmental ownership and cement industry. *significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 10%
However, this correlation does not represent a serious Multicollinearity problem between the independent variables, because is lower than 50%. 
Regression Results
This study estimates the study model using the OLS analysis. Table 5 highlights the results. Overall, the study model is statistically significant, where F-value = 6.600 and Prob>F = 0.000. Furthermore, the study model explains about 38% of the total variation of CSR disclosure, where adjusted R 2 = 0.38. In relation to the first set of variables, ACscore, Brdind, and DulRol, the analysis finds that none is statistically significant. First, the coefficient of the ACscore variable is negative, but statistically insignificant (β1= -0.358, t-statistic= -0.840) F-value = 6.600 Prob>F = 0.000 Overall Adj. R-sq = 0.3773 *Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 10% Second, the analysis finds that the coefficient of the Brdind variable is positive, but statistically insignificant (β2= 0.565, t-statistic= 0.490), indicating that board independence may not affect the CSR disclosure, and thus, could not be deemed a CSR disclosure determinant. This result is not in line with our second hypothesis and that of agency theory that independent directors on boards ought to play a positive role in reducing information asymmetry, and thus, increase the disclosure quality. However, this result is congruent with that of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Bukair and Abdul-Rahman (2015) who find insignificant correlation with CSR disclosure, and with that of Ho and Wong (2001) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) who find insignificant correlation between board independence and disclosure quality in general. Third, the analysis finds that the coefficient of DulRol variable is positive, but statistically insignificant (β3= 1.576, t-statistic= 1.560). This result concludes that CEO/Chairman separation may not be a determinant of CSR disclosure, which contradicts our arguments and those of agency theory that separation of board chairman and CEO roles could improve the disclosure quality. Our results agree with Giannarakis et al. (2014) and Bukair and AbdulRahman (2015) who find that CEO/Chairman separation does not affect the CSR disclosure, and with Ho and Wong (2001) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) who find insignificant correlation between role duality and voluntary disclosure in general. Accordingly, based on the results of the first set of variables, this study concludes that the three examined CG variables may not be beneficial in supporting and inspiring firms' managers towards greater CSR disclosure, and thus, could not be considered to be determinants of CSR disclosure. Regarding the second set of variables, ownership variables, Table 5 shows that there is a significant positive correlation between the Govown variable and CSR disclosure at 10% (β4=4.621, t-statistic=1.71), indicating that firms with higher government ownership are more likely to disclose greater levels of social information than other firms do. This result confirms the arguments and findings of Said et al. (2009) , Ntim et al. (2013) , and Al-Janadi et al (2013) that government ownership could promote social responsibility, transparency, and disclosure practices. The result confirms our argument that governments are socially-oriented, and thus, are more likely to be socially responsible in firms in which they hold ownership, which is expected to reflect positively on CSR disclosure. Accordingly, this study accepts the fourth hypothesis. The results also show a positive but statistically insignificant correlation between the Instown variable and CSR disclosure (β5=0.960, t-statistic=0.540), which implies that institutional ownership could not be deemed a determinant of CSR disclosure. This result contradicts agency theory and the efficient-monitoring hypothesis that institutional investors ought to provide a strong CG mechanism that has a positive impact on monitoring and disclosure quality. However, our result is consistent with those of Eng and Mak (2003) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) who find insignificant correlation between the two variables. Accordingly, this study rejects the study's fifth hypothesis. Furthermore, the results show a statistically significant and positive correlation between Famown and CSR disclosure at 10% (β6=3.014, t-statistic=1.790), concluding that firms with a high percentage of family ownership are more likely to disclose higher levels of CSR information. This result is consistent with our argument and that of Deniz and Suarez (2005) and Block and Wagner (2014) that family firms are more likely to play a positive socially responsible role, which could be reflect positively on CSR disclosure. Based on results of the ownership set of variables, this study concludes that governmental and family ownerships could be determinants of CSR disclosure; however, institutional ownership could not be a CSR disclosure determinant. Regarding the third set of variables, corporate characteristics, the analysis shows that only firm leverage, firm size, and firm age could be determinants of CSR disclosure, while profitability and industry type are not. First, the coefficient of Levg variable is negative and statistically significant at 5% (β7=-5.978, t-statistic=-2.370), implying that firms with higher leverage ratio are less likely to disclose more social information. One explanation for this result may be that highly leveraged firms may trade-off between two alternatives: (1) undertaking social voluntary activities and disclosure with additional costs or (2) paying existing debts. Choosing to reduce high debt levels instead of undertaking costly voluntary activities may appear to be a rational decision for majority of firms, which will be reflected negatively on the CSR disclosure. Second, the coefficient of the Asst variable is found to be statistically significant at 1% and positively correlated with CSR disclosure (β8=3.102, t-statistic=5.000), which implies that larger firms are more likely to disclose higher levels of CSR information. This result is consistent with agency theory that larger firms need to disclose more information in order to reduce the larger information asymmetry and agency costs (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012 However, the analysis shows that both firm profitability and industry type variables are statistically insignificant in correlation with CSR disclosure, indicating that they are not determinants of CSR disclosure.
CONSLUSION
Although Saudi Arabia comprises 25% of the Arab world's GDP and is one of the world largest oil exporters, this study finds very few studies that examine CSR disclosure in the Kingdom. In order to fill this gap in the literature, this study aims to determine the extent of CSR disclosure and its main determinants in one of the emerging Arab countries, Saudi Arabia. The study examines a comprehensive set of 11 variables across CG, ownership structure and corporate characteristics in order to determine the CSR disclosure determinants. This study is important since it evaluates the impact of the Saudi CG code which was applied in 2007, but from a voluntary disclosure perspective. This study employ a self-constructed checklist comprising 17 items relating to CRS disclosure based on ISO 26000. The research uses both the manual content and multiple regression analyses to examine a sample of 267 annual reports during 2007-2011. The results indicate that the CSR disclosure average is about 24% which is higher than the 14. Moreover, the analysis finds significant positive correlations between government ownership, family ownership, firm size, and firm age and CSR disclosure, and a significant negative correlation with firm leverage and CSR disclosure. However, the analysis finds no evidence of correlation between an effective AC, board independence, role duality, institutional ownership, firm profitability, and industry type and CSR disclosure. The study results provide a number of important implications. First, for CG regulators, the results confirm that the application of the Saudi CG code in 2007 may be one of the reasons for the improvement in CSR disclosure. Furthermore, CG regulators should also recognize the positive role that governments and families could play in enhancing the CSR disclosure through shareholdings. Second, for stakeholders, the findings suggest that they should exert greater pressure on managers to disclose extra social information, since the CSR disclosure average is relatively low. Moreover, stakeholders should not expect a high level of CSR disclosure from highly leveraged firms, since these firms appear to prefer to save the costs of extra disclosure in order to repay debts and reduce their high leverage rates. However, this study suffers from a number of limitations. First, the study sample is relatively small. This is due to the use of manual content analysis that requires a considerable time and effort. Second, the study evaluates the period after the application of the Saudi CG code in 2007 and neglects the earlier period. Third, this study measures the quantity of CSR disclosure rather than the qualitative characteristics of the disclosed information. Fourth, the self-constructed checklist comprises a small number of CSR disclosure items, only 17 items. Rizk et al. (2008) state that the checklist items in previous studies range from 17 to 224 items; this means that this study applies the minimum. Future research could overcome these limitations by enlarging the sample size and undertaking a comparative study between the periods before and after the application of the
